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1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we contribute to the recent literature (e.g., Istat, 
2010, Acciari et al., 2016, Guell et al., 2017) that provides evidence that 
inequality is high and social mobility is low in the Italian regions and prov-
inces where organized crime is widespread such as those of Southern Italy. 
We complement this line of work in two respects. First, using a novel pan-
el dataset at the regional level for the period 1985-2014 we investigate the 
relationship between inequality and organized crime at the regional level, 
exploiting both time and cross-sectional variation.6 Second, we assess the 
role of social mobility in organized crime. 
 
Our main hypothesis is that both inequality and intergenerational 
persistence lead to organized crime. There exist various mechanisms for 
why income inequality matters. In particular, direct channels may be at 
work, for example if poor individuals find organized crime attractive for 
lack of remunerative alternatives in the labor market. Alternatively, rich 
individuals, for example members of the economic and political élite, may 
demand organized crime ``services" to gain or preserve their socio-
economic standing. Franchetti (1877) initially pointed out this behavior in 
his thorough enquiry on Sicily at the time of reunification of Italy, as he 
noted that the Sicilian upper class benefited from the protection services by 
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the early mafiosi. Recent evidence supporting this claim is found for ex-
ample in Gambetta and Reuter (1995), describing how entrepreneurs can 
gain monopolistic power by forming cartels enforced by criminal organiza-
tions in the adjudication of public contracts,7 and by De Feo and De Luca 
(2017), who provide evidence on the support that Mafia can give to local 
politicians in exchange for economic benefits.  In addition, indirect chan-
nels can also be at work. This occurs if the expected returns from orga-
nized crime, including possible punishment and opportunity costs, are 
higher than the expected return of the individuals' legal alternatives. Our 
conjecture is that there might be more gains from involvement in orga-
nized crime in the presence of inequality as the latter is likely to lead to 
corruption and erosion of the rule of law (Jong-Sung and Khagram, 2005; 
Sunde et al., 2008). 
 
In addition, we expect that low socio-economic mobility favors 
organized crime development. This fact, as noted, is suggested by the em-
pirical analyses of Acciari et al. (2016), and Guell et al. (2017), although in 
these articles this issue is not considered. Our hypothesis is motivated by the 
ideas of memberships theory of inequality put forward by Durlauf (1996, 1999, 
2006). Cross-sectional inequality leads to segregation that generates gaps in 
the life-time outcomes of children that in turn generate intergenerational 
immobility. Durlauf shows how the co-existence of social interactions and 
residential segregation can lead to intergenerational persistence. The idea 
is that in the presence of complementarity, parents (e.g., role models) will 
make choices about the locations where their children grow up to affect 
their social environment. This leads to neighborhood stratification by in-
come and incentives for segregation. Segregation in turn creates great gaps 
in the capabilities and outcomes of children as they grow up to become 
adults. The higher the degree of segregation, the larger are the gaps in hu-
man capital between children from rich and poor neighborhoods. This cre-
ates the Great Gatsby Curve (Durlauf and Seshadri, 2018). More precisely, 
assuming local public finance of education, rich families will sort them-
selves into rich and low-crime neighborhoods with high-quality schools 
and services.  Poor families will sort themselves into high-crime neighbor-
hoods with poor schools and services. This implies that a child who grows 
up in a disadvantaged neighborhood will receive poor education and it 
more likely to be exposed to a host of negative social interaction effects 
such as the lack of exemplar role models and negative peer effects that can 
influence educational and health outcomes or lead to delinquent behavior.  
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In contrast, favorite outcomes are expected for the human capital and skill 
formation of the children raised in rich neighborhoods. These gaps are then 
transmitted from generation to generation giving rise to intergenerational 
persistence.   
 
Our hypothesis is that in such neighborhoods Mafiosi can represent rel-
evant role models, so that members of young generations have an incentive 
to fill the ranks of criminal organizations. On the other hand, rich families 
tend to cluster to exploit positive spillovers from other rich families. In 
connection with the argument we made to motivate our hypothesis on the 
relationship between inequality and development of organized crime, we 
argue that in dynamic setting, offspring of rich families can have an incen-
tive to exploit the same channels that members of previous generations had 
to increase income and accumulate wealth, including the utilization of the 
services provided by organized crime. Although our interest is on the 
causal link going from social mobility to organized crime development, 
important feedback mechanisms can be at work, so that at this stage we 
cannot make strong claims of causality and just look for robust correlations 
between measures of socio-economic mobility and of organized crime.8 
 
Indeed, the few existing works investigating the relationship between 
organized crime and social mobility study the causal link going from the 
former to the latter. Coniglio et al. (2010) and Caglayan et al. (2017) in 
particular show that the presence of organized crime within the territory in-
terferes with human capital accumulation. In particular, Coniglio et al. 
(2010) argue that the presence of organized crime in Southern Italy, espe-
cially in the region of Calabria, hinders human capital accumulation by re-
ducing incentives to invest in education and by increasing migration out-
flows. Caglayan et al. (2017) instead provides empirical evidence of less 
accumulation of human capital in provinces of Northern Italy where the 
presence of organized crime is widespread.9 
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In our empirical analysis we construct different measures of organized 
crime, which are based on Calderoni (2011) and on dynamic factor meth-
ods (Moench et al. 2011, Banbura and Modugno 2014).  Furthermore, we 
use different inequality indices.  Our main finding is that higher inequality 
leads to higher organized crime development.  The results are robust for 
different organized crime measures and inequality indices.  For all 
measures the ratio of 90th quintile over the 10th in the distribution is a 
strong predictor of organized crime, even if we control for other covariates 
that capture economic development, education, etc. We also find that con-
sumption inequality performs better that income inequality as the relevant 
inequality measure. Finally, we conduct a provincial level analysis to study 
the effect of socio-economic mobility on organized crime, using the Calde-
roni-based indices.  We consider three alternative measures of social mo-
bility. We find that lower socio-economic mobility displays a robust asso-
ciation with organized crime development.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the de-
scription of the dataset; Section 3 describes the methodology employed for 
the empirical analysis; Section 4 presents the results; Section 5 contains a 
discussion of our results; Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. 
 
  2 Data 
 
Our dataset on organized crime and inequality takes the form of an 
unbalanced 5-year period panel for 20 Italian regions for the period 1985-
2014. A detailed description of the data and our sources is given in the Da-
ta Appendix Table A1. While we construct the organized crime variables 
(OC) at the annual frequency we opt to use 5-period averages to reduce 
measurement error bias and ease the problem of missing observations in 
several explanatory variables.  
 
Data on income inequality are obtained from the Survey on House-
hold Income and Wealth (SHIW) provided by Bank of Italy, which com-
prises about 8,000 households (20,000 individuals) per wave. This survey 
includes information on personal income, household consumption and 
wealth, education and occupation. Data on socio-economic mobility are 
from Acciari et al. (2017), and come from Italian tax data at provincial 
level.  
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2.1 Measure of organized crime 
To measure organized crime, we follow the current literature and 
utilize data on crimes committed by members of criminal organizations. 
Data on crimes come from Istat and the SDI database, managed by the Ital-
ian Ministry of Interiors.10 Our analysis distinguishes between two types 
of crimes measures. Type I includes direct measures, i.e. crimes that un-
ambiguously are related to organized crime (2 crimes): Homicide by Mafia 
and Mafia Type Association. Type II includes indirect measures, i.e. 
crimes that are potentially associated to organized crime (14 crimes): 
Criminal Association, Bribery, Corruption for an Act Against Official Du-
ties, Drugs, Extortion, Money Laundering, Prostitution, Smuggling, 
Threats, Usury, Corruption in Public Acts, Instigation to Corrupt, Judicial 
Corruption, Kidnapping for Extortion Purposes.11  
 
Our organized crime measures are based on the joint consideration 
of type I and II crimes. We choose to measure organized crime in this way 
as the relevance of crimes of Type II is remarked in several reports on the 
activities of Italian mafias (see, e.g. Dia, 2016), as well as in the literature 
(see, e.g. Riccardi et al., 2016, and Fioroni et al., 2017). This approach dis-
tinguishes us from, e.g., Calderoni (2011) who focuses on type I crimes 
only.12 In addition, from a statistical point of view, we see organized 
crime as a latent variable, measured with error. In this perspective, the 
higher the number of crimes we consider to measure organized crime, the 
lower the measurement error. 
 
Our organized crime variables are based on two alternative ap-
proaches using 16 crime variables. The first one is based on Calderoni 
(2011) and the second approach employs novel dynamic factor methods 
proposed by Moench, Ng, and Potter (2011) and Banbura and Modugno 
(2014).  
 
                                                            
10 We are grateful to Magg. Domenico Martinelli and to Claudia Di Persio for 
invaluable help, and to the Department on “Analisi Criminale della Direzione 
Centrale della Polizia Criminale” at the Italian Ministry of Interiors for releasing 
the data. 
11 In our empirical analysis, crime numbers are normalized by population. 
12Crime data in Calderoni (2011) are integrated by data on other direct 
measures of Mafia activities: the number of city councils dissolved for Mafia infil-
tration, and a measure of assets confiscated to Mafia clans. See the same article for 
details on other methods to measure organized crime found in the literature. 
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Following Calderoni (2011), we employ two alternative proce-
dures to calculate the Mafia Index. In the first one, we first normalize each 
variable to take values between 0 and 100 with 100 to denote the highest 
value of Mafia presence. Then, we compute the Calderoni Mean Index as 
the average score of all variables. One problem with the average score is 
that may overestimate the presence of the mafia in the Southern regions 
and underestimate it in the other regions. This is because organized crime 
is prevalent in the areas of southern Italy. To overcome this problem we 
also construct an index based on region’s rank. For each variable, we rank 
all the Italian regions in decreasing order. Then we attribute the score of 
100 to the region with the highest rank and proportionally lower scores to 
the other provinces, according to their rank. Then, we compute the Calde-
roni Rank Index as the average score of all variables (see Table 1 in the 
online appendix for summary statistics). 
 
We employ the dynamic factor model method to extract a latent 
factor for organized crime at the regional level. This methodology has not 
been applied to such a purpose before. Let 𝑥! = 𝑥!! , 𝑥!! ,… , 𝑥!" !, 𝑡 =1, . . ,𝑇 denote a stationary n-dimensional vector of crime series standard-
ized to mean 0 and unit variance. We assume that the factor model takes 
the following form:  
 𝐱𝐭 = 𝚲𝐟𝐭 + 𝐞𝐭               (1) 𝐟𝐭 = 𝐀𝐟𝐭!𝟏 + 𝛈𝐭            (2) 
 
where 𝑓! is a 𝑟×1 vector of latent common factors of organized crime 
and 𝑒! = 𝑒!! , 𝑒!! ,… , 𝑒!" !,  is the idiosyncratic component, uncorrelated 
with 𝑓! at all leads and lags13. The errors 𝜂! are assumed to be innovations 
to the factor.  The common component is given by 𝑛×𝑟 matrix Λ, which 
contains factor loadings.  
 
Following Banbura and Modugno (2014) we estimate the dynamic 
factor model using a modified Expectation Maximisation (EM) algorithm. 
The idea of the algorithm is to write the likelihood as if the data were 
complete and to iterate between two steps: in the Expectation step the 
missing data are filled in the likelihood, while in the Maximisation step 
this expectation is re-optimised. This modification is important in our 
                                                            
13 The errors were not allowed to be serially correlated, but this assumption can 
be relaxed later. 
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analysis as it allows us to consider a larger number of time-series that or-
ganized crime regardless of whether they have missing observations or not. 
 
In addition to the latent factor at the regional level we extract fac-
tors at the macro and Italy level for descriptive purposes. In doing so, we 
employ two complementary factor analyses. First, we apply the aforemen-
tioned methodology separately at different levels of aggregation. Figures 1 
(in the online appendix) and 2 provide the t-plots of the factors for results 
for Italy-wide and the macro area factors (Centre, North and South), re-
spectively. It can be observed that there are some large spikes at the begin-
ning of the period, indicating a higher intensity of the phenomenon, while 
fluctuations are much smaller in the subsequent years. 
 
Table 2 presents the estimated the loadings of the factors and Ta-
ble 3 the square loadings (as % of total) to illustrate the relative importance 
of the different crimes14. Table 3 suggests that some of the indirect 
measures of organized crime may have a high capacity to capture the phe-
nomenon, and that the effect is different across the different Italian macro 
regions. For example, different corruption crimes stand out (see, e.g. 
Fioroni et al. 2017, on corruption and organized crime), as well as money 
laundering in the South (see Barone and Masciandaro, 2011, for an analy-
sis of organized crime and money laundering). 
 
Second, we employ the hierarchical dynamic factor models pro-
posed by Moench, Ng, and Potter (2011) to account for the correlations be-
tween the shocks at the different levels of aggregation. In particular, we 
employ this multilevel factor model using common (Italy level - global), 
block-specific (macro regions), and sub-block-specific (regions) to capture 
the within and between-block variations in the measurement system of or-
ganized crime. Given that this method does not allow for missing observa-
tions, we only use a set of five variables (Criminal Association, Drugs, 
Mafia type Association, Extortions and Prostitution). As it is illustrated by 
Figures 3 (in the online appendix) and 4, the common factor exhibits a 
similar pattern to the one we obtained using the first method in Figures 1 
and 2 although it is only based on a much smaller set of variables. Table 4 
presents the variance decomposition analysis to document the examine the 
importance of the variation of aggregate (Italy-wide), block-specific (Mac-
                                                            
14 The factor loadings (estimated as stationary, non time-varying, values) can be 
interpreted as weights telling how much the factor intensity depends (loads) on 
each crime over the period of interest. 
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ro), and subblock-specific (Regional) components as well as idiosyncratic 
noise (IdioNoise) relative to the total variation in the data. 
 
The variations due to idiosyncratic shocks dominate other varia-
tions, in all cases. Overall, we can see that regarding the other variations, 
the subblock specific variations are larger. Notice in particular that in 
Southern regions (where organized crime is more widespread), the region-
al component is relatively high. 
 
2.2 Inequality and socio-economic mobility 
We employ six different inequality metrics that capture different as-
pects of the distribution: (i) the Gini index, (ii) the Atkinson inequality in-
dex15 - and four percentile ratios - (iii) P90/P10, (iv) P75/P25, (v) 
P90/P50, and (vi) P75/P50. The Gini and Atkinson indices take value be-
tween 0 and 1 as opposed to the percentile ratios that do not have this re-
striction. For each inequality metric, we construct 2 different measures of 
inequality based on total consumption and net income. For inequality 
measures on consumption and household income, we consider all the ob-
servations in which the heads of household are aged from 25 to 65. Table 5 
in the online appendix presents summary statistics of these inequality 
measures.  
 
For socio-economic mobility, we use the measure computed by Ac-
ciari et al. (2016), based on Italian tax data. In particular our measures of 
mobility measure immobility between parents' income in 1998 and chil-
dren's income in 2012 at provincial level. The three indices we consider 
are: i) Relative mobility: this is the slope of a rank-rank regression between 
child ranks and parent ranks and measure the difference in outcomes be-
tween children from top vs. bottom income families within province (Chet-
ty et al., 2015). A high value indicates low mobility; ii) Absolute mobility – 
expected rank: this index measures the expected rank of children from 
families at the bottom 25% of the national parent income distribution 
(Chetty et al., 2015). A high value indicates high mobility; iii) Absolute 
mobility – Q1toQ5 measures the probability of rising from the bottom 
quintile to the top quintile of the income distribution (Corak and Heisz 
1999, Hertz 2006). A high value indicates high mobility. 
 
                                                            
15 For definitions and details on the Gini and Atkinson index see e.g. Cowell 
(2011). 
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2.3 Other covariates 
We considered as covariates in our analysis indicators of the econom-
ic conditions and of human capital, under the assumption that bad econom-
ic conditions and low levels of human capital can positively affect orga-
nized crime development. In particular, we used secondary education 
level, the economic activity rate, the growth rate of compensation of em-
ployee, the growth rate of total hours worked, the participation in educa-
tion and training, the long-term unemployment rate, the growth rate of 
gross fixed capital formation (see Table A1 and Table 6 in the online ap-
pendix for the definitions and for summary statistics). 
 
3 Methodology  
The focus of this paper is to investigate how changes in organized 
crime (OC) are related to inequality (INEQ). 
 
Our benchmark model takes form of a dynamic panel model:  
 𝑶𝑪𝒊𝒕 = 𝝆𝑶𝑪𝒊𝒕!𝟏 + 𝜷𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑸𝒊𝒕 + +𝜸′𝒁𝒊  + 𝝃𝒕 + 𝒗𝒊 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕,          (3) 
 
where 𝑣! is the fixed effect, 𝜉! is the time effect, and 𝑢!" is the idiosyn-
cratic error term. 𝑍!" includes a constant and other covariates. Following 
Blundell and Bond (1998), we estimate this model using system 2-step 
GMM up to 4 lags as instrumental variables and robust standard errors16. 
Given that the impact of inequality on organized crime development can 
be not contemporaneous, we also tried specifications with a lagged value 
of INEQ. 
 
In the case of measurement of organized crime by the estimated 
dynamic factor, we had to consider differences in this variable to make the 
series stationary. This implied considering also INEQ in differences. In 
this case the estimated dynamic panel takes the form: 
 𝜟𝑶𝑪𝒊𝒕 = 𝝆𝜟𝑶𝑪𝒊𝒕!𝟏 + 𝜷𝑰𝜟𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑸𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸′𝜟𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝝃𝒕 + 𝒗𝒊 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕     (4) 
 
                                                            
16 We implement this estimation using the Stata package xtabond2 by Roodman 
(2009). 
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As for socio-economic mobility, given that our data are only avail-
able as a cross-section we estimate a simple cross-sectional regression of 
the form: 
 𝑶𝑪𝒊 = 𝜷𝑰𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑸𝒊 + 𝜷𝑴𝑺𝑴𝒊 + 𝜸′𝒁𝒊 + 𝒖𝒊                (5) 
 
The next section contains the results of our econometric analysis. 
 
4 Results 
This section presents the results of our econometric analysis. In 
particular, Section 4.1 discusses the results on inequality and organized 
crime, while Section 4.2 those on socio-economic mobility and OC. 
 
4.1 Organized Crime and Inequality 
Tables 7 and 8 contain the results of regressions of organized crime 
on INEQ for both indices based on Calderoni (2011), i.e. Calderoni Rank 
Index and Calderoni Mean Index, considering respectively indices of in-
come inequality and consumption inequality17. The results show that the 
coefficients of the effect of inequality on organized crime have positive 
and significant coefficients in particular when the Calderoni Mean Index is 
utilized in the regressions. Moreover, it appears that consumption inequali-
ty better captures the relationship of interest. The inequality index with the 
highest level of significance is P90/P10. Under the null of joint validity of 
instruments, the Hansen’s test of over-identification provides us enough 
evidence about the validity of our instruments, in all models (at least at 5% 
significance level).  
 
 Table 9 contains the results of specifications in which we added 
lagged values of inequality indices.18 Results in Table 9 shows that, with 
the Calderoni Mean Index, all six metrics of inequality measures have pos-
itive and significant coefficients: in particular, the contemporaneous values 
of P90/P10, P90/P50 and P75/P50 and the lagged values of the Gini and 
                                                            
17 Regressions are run on data from 19 out of 20 Italian regions. The region of 
Val d’Aosta is dropped for lack of data. 
18 We only report the results for consumption inequality. Results for income in-
equality return a significant coefficient only with the Calderoni Mean Index for 
the lagged values of the Atkinson index (at 5%) and of P90/P10 (at 1%). 
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Atkinson Indices and P75/P25. In the case of the Calderoni Rank Index, 
the coefficients of the lagged values of the Atkinson index, P90/P10, 
P75/P25, P90/P50 are positive and significant. 
Table 10 contains the results of regressions in which we added other co-
variates, related to potential economic determinants of OC.19 Given the 
results presented in the previous tables we kept as our preferred metric of 
inequality the P90/P10 index and its lagged value. Table 10 shows that the 
lagged value of P90/P10 has a positive and significant coefficient in almost 
all the specifications with the Mafia Rank Index.  
 
Table 11 presents the results where the measure of organized crime 
is based on the innovative method we described in Section 2.1.2, based on 
the estimation of a dynamic common factor.20 We can see that the coeffi-
cients of the indices of inequality (in this case appearing as differences) 
have positive and significant coefficients with the exception of P75/P25 
and P75/P50. 
 
Table 12 (in the online appendix) contains the results of the regres-
sions with additional covariates when we consider the effect of consump-
tion inequality on the factor index computed following Banbura and 
Modugno (2014). 21  We can observe that in almost all the specifications 
the effect of inequality (in differences) is positive and significant.  
4.2 Organized Crime and Socio-economic Mobility 
In this section, we present the results of cross-section regressions es-
timating the effect of indicators of socio-economic mobility on OC. The 
analysis is carried out at provincial level. Table 13 in the online appendix 
contains the summary statistics. Table 14 contains simple regressions of 
our two organized crime measures (Calderoni Rank Index and Calderoni 
Mean Index) on the three metrics of socio-economic mobility we consid-
ered in this report only and a constant, while Tables 15, 16 and 17 (in the 
online appendix) adds the covariates related to economic conditions and 
                                                            
19 We only report results for consumption inequality. Regressions on income 
inequality returned positive and significant coefficients for the lagged value of 
P90/P10 in Models 1,2,4,5 with the Calderoni Rank Index. 
20 We only report results for consumption inequality, as regressions on income 
inequality measures did not return significant results. 
21 We also estimated regressions using the Hierarchical dynamic factors, but the 
results were not significant. This is likely due to the fact that we used only five 
variables to estimate them. 
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human capital levels to regressions with the Calderoni Mean Index22. The 
mobility indices’ coefficients have the expected signs and are highly sig-
nificant. The same result holds for Table 18 (in the online appendix), 
which reports the results for the correlation of the relative mobility index 
on the Calderoni Rank Index23. 
 
 
5 Discussion 
The main findings of our study are twofold. First, it documents the linkag-
es between organized crime and inequality. We find that higher levels of 
inequality can lead to higher organized crime development using the per-
centile ratio P90/P10 of consumption inequality. Second, we find that low-
er levels of socio-economic mobility are associated with organized crime 
development.  
 
An important issue is whether changes in welfare are better measured 
by consumption inequality rather than income inequality, especially when 
one examines the role of inequality in organized crime. As argued by Atta-
nasio and Pistaferri (2016) consumption inequality is potentially a better 
measure of changes in welfare than income inequality. According to 
Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis households prefer a smooth con-
sumption flow, that is, they choose to consume a constant fraction of the 
permanent income because annual income is too volatile.  Assuming that 
income can be decomposed into a permanent component and a transitory 
component (e.g., MaCurdy (1982)) we would expect permanent shocks 
(e.g., a technological shock that affects the need for unskilled workers) to 
affect consumption and welfare because it harder to insure against them.  
In contrast, we would not expect transitory shocks to affect consumption 
because individuals can smooth those shocks by borrowing or using their 
assets. In practice, however, full smoothing is infeasible due to the pres-
ence of borrowing constraints and other imperfections of credit and insur-
ance markets. For these reasons, we consider both consumption and in-
come inequality when we study their role in organized crime. Interestingly, 
we find that consumption inequality much greater impact on organized 
crime than income inequality.    
                                                            
22 The set of covariates used for the regional and provincial analysis do not per-
fectly match because of data availability. Model 7 in Tables 15, 16 and 17 con-
tains a dummy for the Northern regions as the latter proved to be highly signifi-
cant in regressions on the mobility indices and macro-region dummies. 
23 The results for the other mobility indices are not significant. 
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These results shed new light on the economic explanations of the rise 
and spread of organized crime and suggest potential policy interventions. 
For example, the fact that consumption inequality seems to matter more 
than income inequality, suggests that what matters are differences in actual 
standards of living, which are better captured by consumption levels than 
by income levels as they depend on life-cycle decisions (see e.g. Jappelli 
and Pistaferri, 2010, for recent trends of income and consumption inequali-
ty in Italy). This directly points out a policy response in terms of insuring 
adequate standard of living to the poor in order to reduce the existing dis-
parities. The same holds for improving the socio-economic mobility, espe-
cially by improving the perspective of those lagging behind the social lad-
der. 
 
 
6 Conclusions  
This study investigates the linkages between organized crime and ine-
quality and social mobility. In doing so we construct a novel dataset of or-
ganized crime at the regional level based on two complementary ap-
proaches. The first one is based on the methodology developed by 
Calderoni (2011) and the second one employs a dynamic factor model. 
Additionally, we construct a wide range inequality as well as social mo-
bility measures. Our dataset is of general interest beyond the specific ap-
plication considered in the present study. Our main finding is that higher 
inequality can lead to higher organized crime development: in particular, 
the index that better captures the effect of inequality is P90/P10. We also 
find that consumption inequality performs better that income inequality as 
the relevant inequality measure. Finally, we find that low socio-economic 
mobility displays a robust association with organized crime development.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Factor for Organized crime based on Banbura and Modugno 
(2014) - Center, North, South Factor levels 
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Figure 4: Factor for Organized crime based on Moench, Ng, and Potter 
(2011) – Macro Regions 
     
 
 
Tables 
 
  Italy North Center South 
Bribery -3,966 4,294 -31,185 -0,257 
Corruption for an action 
against official duties -0,007 -3,089 -7,915 -4,077 
Criminal association 0,765 -0,406 -3,635 0,510 
Drugs 0,032 -0,007 -0,942 0,019 
Extortions 0,242 -0,098 -0,516 0,219 
Homicide by Mafia -0,168 -0,146 -0,732 -0,163 
Mafia type Association -1,004 0,741 5,060 -0,737 
Money laundering -2,453 -0,377 28,086 -6,729 
Prostitution -0,081 0,009 0,438 -0,086 
Smuggling -0,012 0,013 -0,088 -0,006 
Threats -2,535 2,068 -9,125 -1,418 
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Usury 0,687 0,503 -21,516 -0,850 
Corruption in public acts 2,102 -1,473 -55,867 1,696 
Instigation to corrupt -0,397 -2,336 19,441 -1,327 
Judicial corruption 9,423 -5,595 -26,330 1,178 
Kidnapping for  extortion 
purpose -0,225 0,068 -0,757 -0,220 
 
 
Table 2: Factor Loadings computed following Banbura and Modugno 
(2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
  Italy North Centro South 
Bribery 12,71% 25,49% 14,73% 0,09% 
Corruption for an action 
against official duties 0,00% 13,20% 0,95% 23,20% 
Criminal association 0,47% 0,23% 0,20% 0,36% 
Drugs 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 
Extortions 0,05% 0,01% 0,00% 0,07% 
Homicide by Mafia 0,02% 0,03% 0,01% 0,04% 
Mafia type Association 0,81% 0,76% 0,39% 0,76% 
Money laundering 4,86% 0,20% 11,94% 63,19% 
Prostitution 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 
Smuggling 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Threats 5,19% 5,91% 1,26% 2,80% 
Usury 0,38% 0,35% 7,01% 1,01% 
Corruption in public acts 3,57% 3,00% 47,26% 4,01% 
Instigation to corrupt 0,13% 7,55% 5,72% 2,46% 
Judicial corruption 71,75% 43,27% 10,50% 1,94% 
Kidnapping for  extortion 
purpose 0,04% 0,01% 0,01% 0,07% 
Table 3: Square of factor loadings computed following Banbura and 
Modugno (2014), as percentage of the total. 
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    Share F Share G Share H Share Z 
Center Lazio 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,71 
  Marche 0,08 0,07 0,13 0,72 
  Toscana 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,72 
  Umbria 0,19 0,16 0,10 0,55 
North Emilia Romagna 0,17 0,07 0,07 0,69 
  Friuli Venezia Giulia 0,10 0,04 0,17 0,69 
  Liguria 0,21 0,09 0,10 0,61 
  Lombardia 0,20 0,09 0,03 0,68 
  Piemonte 0,20 0,08 0,06 0,66 
  Trentino Alto Adige 0,17 0,07 0,06 0,70 
  Valle D'Aosta 0,15 0,06 0,09 0,70 
  Veneto 0,19 0,08 0,06 0,66 
South Abruzzo 0,02 0,13 0,13 0,71 
  Basilicata 0,00 0,02 0,25 0,72 
  Calabria 0,03 0,14 0,15 0,69 
  Campania 0,01 0,07 0,22 0,70 
  Molise 0,00 0,02 0,22 0,75 
  Puglia 0,01 0,03 0,22 0,75 
  Sardegna 0,01 0,04 0,23 0,72 
  Sicilia 0,01 0,06 0,21 0,72 
Table 4: ShareF, ShareG, ShareH, ShareZ denote the average variance 
share across all variables in the block due to aggregate, block-level, sub-
block-level and idiosyncratic shocks respective 
 
 
 
 
 
X  2/11/y 13:09
Commenta [6]: It is unclear what Share F, 
G, H, and Z are. The text provides some de-
tails by clarifying as follows “aggregate (Italy-
wide), block-specific (Macro), and subblock-
specific (Regional) components as well as idi-
osyncratic noise (IdioNoise)” . Can this be 
added to the column lables in the table to make 
it easier to read? 
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Table 7: This tables presents dynamic panel regressions of Mafia Rank 
Index and Mafia Mean Index based on Calderoni (2011) on alternative in-
come inequality indices.  All results are based on the baseline sample of 5-
year averages. All models control for fixed effects and time period effects.  
Estimation is based on system GMM (Blundell and Bond (1998) using in-
struments up to the 4th lag. Each cell reports the coefficient estimates and 
robust standard errors in the parenthesis.   ***, **, and * denote signifi-
cance of the regression coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
Dependent 
var.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Regressors
Lagged 
Mafia Index
0.60** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.69*** 0.87*** 0.96*** 0.88*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.91***
(0.27) (0.17) (0.06) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Gini 45.96 76.51
(61.63) (56.72)
Atkinson 2.10 33.16
(19.49) (25.84)
P90/P10 2.47** 3.53***
(0.90) (1.04)
P75/P25 8.19 19.70**
(7.37) (8.08)
P90/P50 8.44* 19.80**
(4.20) (8.50)
P75/P50 17.78** 48.77***
(8.13) (16.61)
period3 6.78*** 7.56*** 6.36*** 7.11*** 6.45*** 7.51*** -0.68 -0.98 -1.08 -0.06 -0.49 0.68
(1.67) (1.82) (1.46) (1.55) (1.38) (1.04) (0.98) (1.34) (1.06) (1.17) (1.05) (1.18)
period4 11.55***11.48***10.88*** 11.32*** 10.07***11.18*** 0.42 0.08 0.77 2.07* 0.64 1.37
(1.57) (1.95) (1.56) (1.79) (1.73) (1.57) (0.87) (0.94) (1.01) (1.01) (1.08) (1.05)
period5 4.85* 4.18 3.85** 3.86* 4.27* 4.64*** 0.55 -0.02 0.96 1.22 2.08 1.41
(2.67) (2.64) (1.74) (2.20) (2.18) (1.47) (2.66) (2.54) (2.73) (2.73) (2.69) (2.73)
period6 5.65*** 5.44** 4.43** 5.05*** 4.93*** 6.21*** -0.11 -1.87 -1.01 -0.04 1.12 1.06
(1.55) (2.04) (1.57) (1.37) (1.51) (1.39) (1.45) (2.31) (1.39) (1.28) (1.37) (1.38)
Constant -6.55 2.46 -5.71 -13.01 -11.58 -20.20* -15.51 -6.46 -7.02 -35.74** -35.22* -63.34**
(11.44) (4.88) (3.59) (9.30) (7.07) (9.81) (18.42) (10.30) (6.28) (16.38) (17.73) (25.81)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Number of 
Regions
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Hansen test 
p-value
0.818 0.730 0.925 0.761 0.986 0.749 0.540 0.387 0.446 0.555 0.554 0.511
Mafia Rank Index Mafia Mean Index
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Table 8: This tables presents dynamic panel regressions of Mafia Rank 
Index and Mafia Mean Index based on Calderoni (2011) on alternative 
consumption inequality indices.  All results are based on the baseline sam-
ple of 5-year averages. All models control for fixed effects and time period 
effects.  Estimation is based on system GMM (Blundell and Bond (1998) 
using instruments up to the 4th lag. Each cell reports the coefficient esti-
mates and robust standard errors in the parenthesis.   ***, **, and * denote 
significance of the regression coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
Dependent 
var.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Regressors
Lagged 
Mafia Index 0.80*** 0.46*** 0.63*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.91*** 0.99*** 1.04*** 0.98*** 0.93** 0.94***
(0.09) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.33) (0.18)
Gini 41.41 179.06**
(42.08) (71.75)
Atkinson 82.54* 151.78**
(42.77) (61.62)
P90/P10 5.65 13.85***
(5.74) (4.51)
P75/P25 10.26 33.27
(14.35) (19.90)
P90/P50 2.72 50.19
(6.86) (30.88)
P75/P50 53.59** 98.06**
(24.95) (37.02)
period3 8.30*** 6.66*** 6.97*** 8.28*** 7.61*** 6.09*** 1.62 1.11 0.48 0.42 -0.39 -0.91
(1.35) (1.72) (1.50) (1.42) (1.21) (1.34) (2.20) (2.47) (2.12) (1.72) (2.10) (1.80)
period4 11.94*** 10.19*** 10.99*** 11.98*** 11.41*** 9.82*** 1.51 1.72 -0.29 0.11 0.87 -0.53
(2.25) (2.63) (1.97) (2.66) (2.38) (1.75) (2.10) (2.39) (2.67) (2.13) (2.09) (1.86)
period5 4.38* 7.88*** 5.51* 4.67 4.24* 3.33 3.17 4.58 3.98 1.11 4.83 0.47
(2.35) (2.61) (2.67) (2.72) (2.07) (2.21) (4.70) (4.27) (4.71) (4.51) (4.64) (3.68)
period6 5.61*** 6.94*** 6.00*** 5.71** 5.50*** 5.36*** 2.57 1.44 0.22 0.57 3.64 1.81
(1.71) (1.47) (1.64) (2.00) (1.76) (1.50) (2.41) (2.78) (2.18) (2.57) (3.33) (1.78)
Constant -9.86 -5.05 -11.31 -16.27 -1.94 -68.27** -42.68 -30.40 -45.61** -58.36 -88.77 -128.52**
(11.01) (11.76) (15.53) (25.23) (12.39) (32.19) (25.42) (19.12) (19.59) (40.67) (71.94) (57.21)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Number of 
Regions 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Hansen test 
p-value 0.983 0.187 0.979 0.986 0.968 0.998 0.103 0.0729 0.0866 0.0571 0.169 0.232
Mafia Rank Index Mafia Mean Index
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Table 9: This tables presents dynamic panel regressions of Mafia Rank 
Index and Mafia Mean Index based on Calderoni (2011) on alternative in-
equality indices.  All results are based on the baseline sample of 5-year av-
erages. All models control for fixed effects and time period effects.  Esti-
mation is based on system GMM (Blundell and Bond (1998) using 
instruments up to the 4th lag. Each cell reports the coefficient  estimates 
and robust standard errors in the parenthesis.   ***, **, and * denote signif-
icance of the regression coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
Dependent var.
Dependent var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Regressors
Lagged Mafia 
Index 0.42** 0.42** 0.35 0.76*** 0.50 0.47 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.92*** 0.84***
(0.17) (0.15) (0.25) (0.08) (0.31) (0.29) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Gini 78.50 32.85
(72.39) (46.96)
Lagged Gini 41.35 70.80**
(31.44) (33.06)
Atkinson 57.76 20.39
(60.21) (41.88)
Lagged Atkinson 48.23* 53.51*
(26.09) (29.15)
P90/P10 1.25 15.28***
(5.22) (4.30)
Lagged P90/P10 3.81* -2.84
(2.13) (3.46)
P75/P25 -3.80 3.53
(13.20) (15.78)
Lagged P75/P25 20.19* 14.98*
(11.46) (8.27)
P90/P50 0.32 21.79**
(12.23) (9.80)
Lagged P90/P50 13.74* 1.97
(7.27) (8.22)
P75/P50 31.88 86.02*
(90.24) (41.14)
Lagged P75/P50 5.63 -7.93
(43.36) (26.16)
period3 5.55** 5.09*** 5.00*** 5.37** 6.00*** 5.48** -1.43 -1.28 1.05 -0.89 0.06 -1.28
(2.11) (1.45) (1.57) (2.19) (1.44) (2.08) (1.16) (1.24) (1.54) (1.23) (1.08) (1.37)
period4 10.05*** 9.98*** 10.75*** 8.70*** 9.72*** 10.42*** -0.97 -0.85 1.03 -0.59 -0.06 -0.71
(1.97) (1.83) (1.49) (1.96) (2.64) (2.16) (1.10) (1.23) (2.19) (1.05) (1.45) (1.81)
period5 7.22** 7.15** 6.45** 1.48 4.12 5.84** -0.47 -0.33 4.16 -0.57 2.31 1.70
(3.10) (2.87) (2.97) (2.24) (4.51) (2.42) (3.08) (3.07) (3.18) (2.43) (2.79) (3.07)
period6 7.85*** 7.37*** 7.49*** 4.04** 6.91** 6.67*** 0.54 0.37 1.11 0.20 2.27 0.85
(1.87) (1.71) (1.77) (1.74) (3.01) (1.69) (1.87) (1.76) (1.23) (1.56) (1.82) (1.61)
Constant -17.60 -6.92 -1.11 -24.51 -15.19 -39.62 -18.61 -5.43 -35.72** -23.77 -39.73** -96.18**
(19.88) (13.03) (16.68) (20.99) (30.31) (73.91) (14.26) (10.20) (15.23) (25.63) (14.84) (37.50)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Number of 
Regions 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Hansen test p-
value 0.360 0.405 0.518 0.675 0.549 0.399 0.966 0.961 0.344 0.981 0.910 0.989
Mafia Rank Index Mafia Mean Index
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Table 10: This table presents dynamic panel regressions of the Mean 
Mafia Index, which is the Mafia Rank Index based on Calderoni (2011), 
on P90/P10 ratio and other  determinants. All results are based on the base-
line sample of 5-year averages.  All models control for fixed effects and 
time period effects.  Each cell reports the coefficient  estimates and robust 
standard errors in the parenthesis. All regression models include fixed ef-
fects and time effects. Estimation is based on system GMM (Blundell and 
Bond (1998) using instruments up to the 4th lag.   ***, **, and * denote 
significance of the regression coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent var
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Regressors
Lagged Mafia 
Index 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.85*** 0.93*** 0.84*** 0.92*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.70*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.65***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
P90/P10 0.63 -1.99 -0.00 -2.42 2.49 -1.88 -2.12 0.56 1.15 1.16 0.66 0.12 0.48 0.91 1.43 0.85
(1.08) (2.37) (3.31) (1.86) (3.22) (1.67) (2.59) (3.10) (1.38) (1.47) (1.94) (1.52) (1.88) (1.19) (1.50) (2.01)
Lagged P90/P10 3.66*** 2.06* -0.07 2.09** 7.52*** 1.12 1.22 0.13 1.76 1.52 1.67 1.60 0.89 0.75 0.46 1.47
(1.18) (1.11) (1.78) (0.98) (2.28) (0.92) (1.06) (1.98) (2.07) (2.15) (2.26) (1.84) (2.34) (1.74) (1.88) (2.39)
Economic 
activity rate -0.79*** -0.60* -0.71*** -1.54*** -0.75*** -0.86*** -0.77** -0.20 -0.31 -0.21* -0.19 -0.24 -0.21 -0.35
(0.22) (0.29) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.25) (0.30) (0.15) (0.26) (0.11) (0.21) (0.14) (0.15) (0.25)
Secondary 
Education level -0.42 0.08
(0.45) (0.44)
Compensation of 
employees 26.97 -32.20
(54.31) (29.36)
Long-run 
unemployment -3.12*** 0.30
(0.72) (0.55)
Gross fixed capital 
formation 23.15 -3.32
(37.95) (30.03)
Total hours 
worked -314.74** 2.52
(144.53) (144.82)
Part. in education 
and training -0.19 1.08
(3.40) (2.43)
period3 -1.10 -1.64 0.00 -0.88 6.92*** -2.56 0.82 0.00 5.66*** 0.93 0.00 1.71 0.42 1.53 1.21 0.00
(1.23) (2.67) (0.00) (2.61) (2.24) (3.36) (2.74) (0.00) (1.61) (2.31) (0.00) (1.90) (3.48) (2.60) (2.27) (0.00)
period4 -1.84 -2.31 55.15** -2.31 0.97 -2.76 1.22 47.61* 9.05*** 4.30* 3.76 4.82** 4.03 5.00* 5.01* 5.38
(1.21) (2.16) (24.61) (2.24) (1.63) (2.92) (2.98) (24.54) (2.12) (2.21) (3.99) (1.93) (2.56) (2.72) (2.57) (5.58)
period5 -0.12 57.85** 49.36* 3.84* -0.48 -0.17
(2.34) (24.64) (26.40) (1.85) (2.78) (2.85)
period6 -0.37 1.39 59.12** 2.25 7.17*** 2.15 -2.42 49.39 4.23*** 0.40 0.00 0.28 0.04 0.43 0.30 0.00
(1.39) (3.24) (27.69) (2.85) (1.87) (2.61) (3.44) (29.45) (1.44) (1.84) (0.00) (2.02) (2.16) (2.02) (3.11) (0.00)
Constant -11.42 47.21** 0.00 43.43** 67.91*** 48.34*** 57.95** 0.00 -4.39 11.79 17.63 14.64 14.70 16.73 14.37 14.72
(6.67) (18.96) (0.00) (15.77) (20.51) (15.80) (21.67) (0.00) (5.10) (12.34) (18.20) (9.83) (14.42) (11.94) (11.35) (18.27)
Observations 95 72 55 72 70 72 72 55 95 72 55 72 70 72 72 55
Number of 
Regions 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Hansen test p-
value 0.410 0.456 0.167 0.943 0.902 0.987 0.997 0.0938 0.867 0.628 0,309 0.971 0.739 0.972 0.971 0.376
Mafia Mean IndexMafia Rank Index
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Table 11: The tables presents regressions of two latent factors on alter-
native inequality of consumption indices. In  Panel A, we have the results 
of a factor constructed using a hierachical dynamic factor methodology , 
while in Panel B we show the results of a dynamic factor estimated by us-
ing a modified Expectation Maximisation (EM) algorithm. Given that the 
latent factors are constructed on transformed data to endure stationarity 
(growth rates) we also transform the regressors into first differences, too. 
All results are based on the baseline sample of 5-year averages. Each cell 
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Regressors
Lagged Mafia Index -0.43 -0.41 -0.37 -0.37* -0.32* -0.26* -0.09* -0.11 -0.16* -0.12 -0.11 -0.12**
(0.25) (0.25) (0.32) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05)
ΔGini 1.42** 2.08*
(0.64) (1.02)
ΔAtkinson 1.16** 1.51*
(0.53) (0.77)
ΔP90/P10 0.15* 0.14**
(0.08) (0.07)
ΔP75/P25 0.08 0.23
(0.16) (0.26)
ΔP90/P50 0.34** 0.24***
(0.14) (0.07)
ΔP75/P50 -0.52 1.18
(0.40) (1.19)
period3 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.03* -0.00 -0.04 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)
period4 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
period5 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.05*** 0.09 0.10 0.10* 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)
period6 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Constant -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03* -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Number of Regions 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Hansen test p-value 0.280 0.297 0.574 0.445 0.553 0.307 0.624 0.219 0.987 0.210 0.404 0.461
Hierarchical Dynamic Factor Analysis EM Algorithm
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reports the coefficient  estimates and robust standard errors in the paren-
thesis.  All regressions control for fixed effects and time period effects. 
***, **, and * denote significance of the regression coefficient at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: The tables presents cross-sectional regressions of three alter-
native  socio-economic mobility measures. All results are based on the 
baseline sample of 5-year averages. Each cell reports the coefficient  esti-
mates and robust standard errors in the parenthesis.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance of the regression coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Absolute Upward Mobility: Expected Rank -60.35*** -53.19**
(9.776) (20.72)
Absolute Upward Mobility: Q1Q5 -50.32*** -39.19**
(9.324) (18.56)
Relative Mobility 116.7*** 179.2***
(23.62) (42.37)
Constant 48.81*** 27.42*** 1,25 75.18*** 55.65*** 20.44***
(4.778) (1.471) (3.901) (9.849) (2.842) (7.253)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0,269 0,218 0,235 0,064 0,041 0,17
Mafia Mean Index (Type I, II) Mafia Rank Index (Type I, II)
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